This sheet is past its review date. Deadlines or advice may have changed since 5 Nov 2026.
Active Directory: could any user become Domain Admin today?
This month, run PingCastle or Defender for Identity on every domain and close what lets any user reach Domain Admin: weak certificate templates, unconstrained delegation, loose permissions and a machine account quota above 0. Then retire NTLM, RC4 and stale accounts behind audit logs, and reassess quarterly.
If you only do five things
Find the paths before attackers do.
Run PingCastle or Purple Knight, and BloodHound CE, on every domain. Any AD user can find and exploit its weaknesses1.
Fix certificate templates.
A template any user can enroll in, with a supplied subject name, client authentication and no approval, lets them impersonate anyone, even a domain admin5.
Remove unconstrained delegation.
Use resource-based constrained delegation instead, set Account is sensitive and cannot be delegated on admins and stop the Print Spooler on DCs1.
Run your first assessment
What do you already own?
Defender for Identity (Microsoft 365 E5, E5 Security, EMS E5 or standalone12) shows findings in Secure Score. Its CA checks need a sensor on the CA servers5.
What does a free scan find?
PingCastle's open source edition is free for internal use, also by your IT provider, but not to sell as a service22. Purple Knight is free, needs no admin rights23 and is barred in or for China, Russia and other listed countries24. Ask Semperis for its EULA first.
Who can reach Tier 0?
Load SharpHound data into BloodHound CE (Apache 2.025) and list the paths from Domain Users and Domain Computers to Tier 0. Tell your SOC first.
What do you fix first?
What any user can exploit: templates, stray DCSync rights10 and write access to AdminSDHolder, GPOs or admin groups. Then delegation and NTLM.
When do you look again?
Every quarter and after major changes. For high protection needs, BSI recommends regular attack path analysis2.
Certificate Services (ESC1 to ESC17)
- Templates (ESC1 to ESC4, named by SpecterOps3). Turn off Supply in the request or require approval, remove write rights for broad groups and unpublish unused templates5.
- CA settings (ESC6, ESC11, ESC15, ESC16). Clear
EDITF_ATTRIBUTESUBJECTALTNAME2, setIF_ENFORCEENCRYPTICERTREQUEST, patch CVE-2024-490195 and keep the SID extension out ofDisableExtensionList4. - Web enrollment (ESC8). Require EPA and HTTPS6, or remove it if unused4.
- Log it. Turn on CA auditing, off by default, and alert on events 4886, 4887, 4899 and 49001.
Kerberos, delegation and krbtgt
- Find what still uses RC4. KDCSVC errors 203, 204, 208 and 209 show requests DCs now block; keytab devices can fail with no event7. Run
Get-KerbEncryptionUsage.ps1 -Encryption RC4and reset accounts without AES keys8. - Check all delegation. Defender for Identity flags any delegation that exposes sensitive accounts10. Protected Users can't be delegated1, and BSI requires privileged accounts there2.
- Rotate krbtgt in two steps. Let the first reset reach every DC before the second1. RODCs have their own
krbtgt_accounts9. Move SPN accounts to gMSAs, as the non-human identities sheet describes.
NTLM and LDAP
- Log NTLM for the whole domain. Check that Log Enhanced Domain-wide NTLM Logs is on for DCs. Events 4030 to 4033 show NTLM and NTLMv1 use; Server 2019 and 2022 got them in October 202614.
- Restrict it in stages. After the audit, deny NTLM on CA, Entra Connect and Cloud Sync servers first, as Microsoft advises61617. Then deny it domain-wide with Restrict NTLM and server exceptions.
- Get ready for NTLM off by default in the next major Windows Server release15.
- Require LDAP signing and channel binding once their audit events stop, as BSI expects2. Defender for Identity lists clear-text binds10.
Permissions and stale objects
- Take DCSync rights from non-admins. Defender for Identity lists them10; review the remaining holders every six months1.
- Check who can change the admins. Remove non-admin rights on AdminSDHolder and sensitive groups10. Give Domain Computers no write rights anywhere1.
- Clear risky attributes. Remove passwords from descriptions, Password not required and Do not require Kerberos preauthentication10.
- Disable accounts idle for 90 days and delete them weeks later10, within your retention rules2.
- Guard DC and CA backups like the servers. They hold every password hash and the CA key1. The ransomware sheet covers forest recovery.
Entra Connect, Cloud Sync and Seamless SSO
- Move Connect Sync to application-based authentication on 2.6.84.0 or later by 7 April 2027, or sync stops16. Keep its key in a TPM, delete the
Sync_account and treat Application Administrators as sync admins: they can act as the app18. - Rotate the
MSOL_password in AD and Connect every 90 days, keep it out of admin groups and drop replication rights without password hash sync11. - Roll the Seamless SSO key at least every 30 days with
Update-AzureADSSOForest, once per forest20. Its holder can impersonate any synced user11. - Harden Cloud Sync the same way: gMSA agent, Tier 0 server, no NTLM17. For both, block soft matching and hard match takeover16.
What changed in 2026
- DCs assume AES for accounts without set encryption types since April 2026, with no rollback since July. A DC with its own
DefaultDomainSupportedEncTypeskeeps it and logs event 205 if it allows RC47. - Connect Sync tenants are moving to Cloud Sync. Microsoft notifies each tenant of its window from July 2026, simple setups first21.
- Synced users can become cloud users. Since January 2026 you can move a user's source of authority to Entra ID21.
- Defender for Identity's v3 sensor reached CA and Entra Connect servers in September 2026, as a preview. October brought ESC1, ESC8 and ESC11 alerts13.
What you can skip
- Paid AD audit suites first. Fix what the free tools find, then buy continuous monitoring.
- Studying all 17 ESC classes. Let a scanner find them. Some need parts you may not run, like web enrollment (ESC8) or a YubiHSM (ESC12)4.
- Monthly krbtgt rotation. ASD asks for every six months and after a suspected compromise1.
Mistakes that cost the most
- Re-enabling RC4 domain-wide. A
DefaultDomainSupportedEncTypesof 0x24 leaves every account vulnerable; allow RC4 per service7. - Fixing a template, keeping its certificates. They stay valid until they expire or are revoked1; revoke those issued to someone else.
- Running the Seamless SSO rollover twice in a row. A second run on one forest breaks Seamless SSO until users' Kerberos tickets expire20.
What this looks like at your size
Small team, no security staff
- Have your IT provider run PingCastle or Purple Knight quarterly and fix what any user can exploit.
- Set the machine account quota to 0 and remove unconstrained delegation outside DCs.
- If all PCs are Entra or hybrid joined, you may not need Seamless SSO19.
Growing, with IT or security staff
- Run BloodHound CE every quarter and track the paths from Domain Users to Tier 0.
- Log NTLM domain-wide and give each dependency an owner and an end date.
- Rotate krbtgt every six months from a written runbook.