This sheet is past its review date. Deadlines or advice may have changed since 5 Nov 2026.
Containers and Kubernetes: could one compromised pod take over the cluster?
This month, take the API server off the internet, enforce the baseline Pod Security Standard in every app namespace after a dry run and start replacing Ingress NGINX, which has had no upstream security fixes since March 202613. Then judge every other setting by whether it stops one compromised pod from reaching its node, the cloud account or a more powerful service account.
If you only do five things
Treat pod creation as a privileged right.
Anyone who can create pods in a namespace can mount its Secrets and run as any of its service accounts3. Each quarter, list who holds that right,
cluster-adminor the rights below, and cut the list.
Harden a running cluster in this order
Who can reach and administer it?
List each cluster's endpoint, version, add-ons and
cluster-adminbindings. Find Ingress NGINX withkubectl get pods -A -l app.kubernetes.io/name=ingress-nginx12.Which pods would Pod Security reject?
Label namespaces with
--dry-run=serverto list pods that would fail6, and set thewarnandauditlabels first. They also check Deployments, whileenforcechecks only pods, so a noncompliant Deployment is accepted but its pods are rejected5.Does your network plugin enforce NetworkPolicy?
If not, a NetworkPolicy has no effect. Namespace by namespace, allow the traffic you need, DNS included, then add default-deny ingress and egress policies8.
What does Pod Security miss?
Add admission rules for image sources and digests1; signing is in the supply-chain sheet. ValidatingAdmissionPolicy is built in and can
WarnandAuditbefore it denies7; Kyverno and OPA Gatekeeper are add-ons4.Would you see a takeover?
Turn on audit logs: they are off by default on EKS20 and need a diagnostic setting with
kube-auditon AKS25. Alert onexecinto pods, new cluster role bindings and Secrets listed by people. Retention is in the logging sheet.
Defaults to change on EKS, AKS and GKE
Amazon EKS
Azure AKS
Google GKE
What changed in 2026
- Ingress NGINX is retired. Upstream has had no fixes since 24 March 202613; AKS patches its managed NGINX add-on only through November 202627. Move to Gateway API or another controller12.
- Kubernetes 1.36 closed old gaps. It disabled
gitRepovolumes for good and deprecated ServiceexternalIPs13. - AKS will upgrade unsupported clusters itself. From 1 June 2027, then 60 days after each version's end of life, ignoring maintenance windows26.
- Linux root exploits came with public code. Three flaws disclosed from 29 April to 13 May 2026 gave local users root on major distributions18. Patch node images within the patching sheet's deadlines.
RBAC rights that allow escalation
get,listorwatchon Secrets. List and watch return the contents too3.escalate,bindandimpersonate. They bypass RBAC's escalation checks or borrow another user's rights3.- Any right on
nodes/proxy. Evengetruns commands in every pod on the node, unaudited and past admission control3. - Webhook, token and volume rights. Control of webhook configurations, or
createonserviceaccounts/tokenor PersistentVolumes, exposes admitted objects, mints tokens or mounts the node's disk3. patchon namespaces. It lets a user relabel a namespace to a looser Pod Security level3.
Pod and node settings that stop an escape
- Non-root, read-only, no escalation. Restricted requires
runAsNonRoot, no privilege escalation, seccomp and droppingALLcapabilities4. AddreadOnlyRootFilesystem2. - User namespaces. Set
hostUsers: false, GA on Linux since 1.36, to map container root to an unprivileged host user14. - Minimal images by digest. Ship no shells or debug tools, pin sha256 digests instead of tags and scan at build and deploy1.
- Secrets as files. Environment variables may leak more easily; mount secrets from an external store with the Secrets Store CSI Driver1.
- Kubelet API. On your own nodes, turn off
--anonymous-authand set--authorization-mode=Webhook: the defaults allow anonymous access9.
What you can skip
- A service mesh just for encryption. The checklist suggests one only if your network plugin can't encrypt traffic1.
- Waiting for fixes to old CVEs. Scanners can flag CVE-2020-8561, CVE-2020-8562 and CVE-2021-25740 on every version since June 2026; they won't be fixed15. Mitigate once and accept them.
- CPU limits on every pod. They throttle work and can upset autoscaling; the checklist suggests them only for sensitive workloads1.
Mistakes that cost the most
- Exempting a controller from Pod Security. Exempting the ReplicaSet controller exempts everyone who can create a Deployment5.
- Giving CI cluster-wide rights. UNC4899 made CI jobs print service account tokens to logs, then used a highly privileged one to escalate17.
- Binding roles to built-in groups.
system:unauthenticatedis anyone who can reach the API server3; on GKE,system:authenticatedincludes any Google account28.
What this looks like at your size
Small team, no security staff
- Prefer a managed mode with secure defaults: GKE Autopilot blocks privileged pods by default29.
- Limit the API server to your VPN or office addresses, and turn on audit logs.
- Enforce baseline in every app namespace and turn on automatic patch upgrades.
Growing, with IT or security staff
- Reach a private API server through a VPN or bastion, with SSO groups mapped to RBAC roles.
- Keep admission and network policies in Git, and move each rule from warn to deny.
- Upgrade one minor version every four months, as they ship26, staging cluster first.