This sheet is past its review date. Deadlines or advice may have changed since 5 Nov 2026.
DNS and domains: could someone hijack your domains or your DNS?
This month, put phishing-resistant MFA on every registrar and DNS provider account, registry-lock the few domains that sign-in, email and your website depend on, and publish CAA records on every domain. Then send all user DNS through a validating, filtering resolver you control, and sign zones with DNSSEC only where your provider automates the keys.
If you only do five things
Put phishing-resistant MFA on every registrar and DNS account.
In the campaign behind CISA's ED 19-01, attackers used stolen credentials to change DNS records, then got valid certificates to decrypt the redirected traffic1. Use security keys or passkeys.
Registry-lock the domains everything depends on.
Anyone in your registrar account can ask to lift a registrar lock. A registry lock is set by the registry and can take longer to remove5; DENIC's .de lock needs a named contact to confirm each change6. Lock the domains behind sign-in, email, your website and name servers. Test an unlock, since the lock also delays urgent fixes.
Send all user DNS through a resolver you control.
Validate DNSSEC, block known-bad domains with protective DNS, log queries and block DNS that goes around your resolvers3.
If your domain or DNS is hijacked
Check the delegation at the registry.
Query the TLD's name servers for your NS and DS records. Your DNS provider's console can look normal while the domain points elsewhere.
Call your registrar and DNS provider.
Ask both to freeze the domain. If a gTLD domain was transferred away, only the registrars involved can file an ICANN transfer dispute, within 12 months9, so push yours to act today.
Lock the attacker out and restore.
Change the passwords and MFA of every account that can change DNS records, and audit every public record on all authoritative servers, as ED 19-01 required before CISA retired it in 202612. Revoke API keys and compare against your last zone export.
Hunt down certificates.
Find certificates issued during the hijack in CT logs and report them to the issuing CA1. CAA can't stop issuance during a hijack, but CAA bound to your ACME account stops attackers reusing that validation afterwards21.
Treat redirected traffic as stolen.
Reset passwords of users who signed in during the window, rotate secrets sent by email and check the EU security laws sheet for reporting duties.
Registrar and DNS provider accounts
- One owner, several hands. Move domains out of personal, agency and hosting accounts into ones your organization owns, and have one internal group register every domain4.
- Scope who can change records. In Azure DNS, grant DNS Zone Contributor per zone and ReadOnly-lock zones that rarely change. A CanNotDelete lock on the SOA record blocks deleting the zone11.
- Alert on NS and MX changes and keep DNS change logs in your SIEM4. Export every zone weekly as a known-good copy.
- Report lookalikes to the registrar. Monitor new registrations3. Registrars of gTLDs must act promptly on actionable evidence of phishing and other DNS abuse10.
DNSSEC and CAA
- Sign only where your provider automates the keys. DNSSEC can't stop someone who logs in to your registrar or DNS provider, but it lets CAs detect forged CAA records19. Use ECDSA P-256 or Ed25519; RSA/SHA-1 is deprecated17.
- Know what breaks. Since 15 March 2026, CAs must validate DNSSEC and may not treat a validation error as permission to issue18, so a broken signature also blocks renewals. Moving DNS provider? Pull the DS record and wait out its TTL first, as Route 53's guide does13.
- Bind CAA to your ACME account. Let's Encrypt honors
accounturinow20; list every account you renew with. All CAs must from 15 March 2027, and email validation ends on 15 March 202818.
What your resolvers should do
- Recurse only for your own clients. No internet-facing server should be both authoritative and recursive3.
- Validate DNSSEC with automatic trust anchor updates, two time sources and QNAME minimization3.
- Block DNS that goes around them: outbound ports 53 and 853 except from your resolvers, and known public DoH servers3.
- Log queries. Always log blocked queries, and keep a full log for forensics even if the SIEM gets less3. In Germany, agree per-user logs and their retention with the works council15.
- Practice turning off validation for one zone. A faulty DENIC key rollover on 5 May 2026 broke .de names, signed or not, on validating resolvers; some large operators suspended validation for .de14.
Protective DNS and DNS over HTTPS
- Small teams can start free. Cloudflare's Zero Trust Free plan, for teams under 50 users, includes its web gateway and keeps logs 24 hours22. Quad9 welcomes business forwarders if it is their only upstream; log queries there yourself23.
- Otherwise buy one with logs and an API. Ask for current deny lists, editable allow lists and block logs your SIEM can pull; Cloudflare exports logs only on contract plans22. It doesn't replace your own DNS logs24.
- Want resolution kept in the EU? DNS4EU's free resolver is for individuals only; companies use Whalebone Immunity, its commercial version on European infrastructure25.
- Control DoH in browsers. Chrome sends no DoH on managed devices unless the
DnsOverHttpsModepolicy allows it26. Lock Firefox'sDNSOverHTTPSpolicy to off or to your resolver'sProviderURL27.
What changed in 2026
- Three ccTLD registries were hijacked. Attackers compromised the registries of .gh, .sl and .as, changed DNS records and got certificates for Google and other brands. Google advises restrictive CAA with ACME account bindings21.
- The root zone has a new key. KSK-2024 (key tag 38696) has signed it since 11 October 2026. Check each validating resolver's trust anchors instead of assuming automatic updates worked16.
- .de verifies holder data. Under NIS2, DENIC has risk-checked holder data since December 2025, now including a phone number, and existing domains can be asked to verify too87. Verification runs only through your provider, and DENIC never asks for passwords by email7.
- Windows DNS Server speaks DoH. Since the June 2026 update, Windows Server 2025 accepts DoH from clients, but not toward upstream servers28. Clients can encrypt DNS without bypassing your resolver.
What you can skip
Mistakes that cost the most
- Domains in an account that can close. Closing an AWS account suspends its Route 53 domains within 5 days12.
- Recovery email on the domain itself. A hijacker then gets your password resets. Use an address on another domain.
- Deleting the zone, not the delegation. An attacker with an account at that DNS host may then take over the name3.
What this looks like at your size
Small team, no security staff
- Move every domain into a registrar account you own, with two admins on security keys.
- Turn on auto-renew and registrar lock everywhere, and publish CAA for the CA you use.
- Point your firewall at business-ready protective DNS, such as Cloudflare's free plan or Quad9.
Growing, with IT or security staff
- Registry-lock the critical domains, export zones weekly and alert on NS and MX changes.
- Run validating resolvers with protective DNS and set browser DoH policies.
- Rehearse the hijack steps yearly with your registrar's real contacts.
Enterprise or regulated
- Consolidate at one corporate registrar with registry lock and named contacts.
- Require two-person approval for registrar and DNS changes.
- If you provide DNS for others, check NIS2 scope in the EU security laws sheet.