This sheet is past its review date. Deadlines or advice may have changed since 4 Nov 2026.
Encryption: who can decrypt your data, and what must you start for post-quantum?
Automate renewal of every public TLS certificate before the maximum lifetime drops to 100 days on 15 March 20271, and inventory your cryptography this quarter so data that must stay secret for ten years or more gets hybrid post-quantum key exchange first. Then judge each measure by who can use the key, and whether you could still decrypt if it were deleted.
If you only do five things
Inventory your cryptography.
List TLS endpoints, certificates, keys and who holds them, algorithms and trust stores. The EU roadmap calls this a no-regret first step that needn't be complete before you set priorities9.
Get secrets out of code and into a vault.
Give apps managed identities, not stored credentials, and one vault per app and environment17. Rotate any exposed secret at once. For CI tokens, see the supply-chain sheet.
Build a first cryptographic inventory
Which data must stay secret for ten years or more?
The EU roadmap counts it as high-risk and wants it protected from quantum attacks by the end of 20308. Think of health and HR records, contracts, designs and their backups.
Where does it travel and where is it stored?
Follow it through load balancers, VPNs, SSH, APIs, databases and backups, including systems your managed service providers run.
What protects it, and who holds the key?
Record the protocol and key exchange, the certificate and issuer, where the key lives (HSM, cloud KMS or a file) and who can use it. AWS load balancer connection logs record the negotiated key exchange16.
Which trust stores do your systems rely on?
List the CA bundle in each runtime, container image and appliance, and how each one gets updated. For Python, see the secure-python sheet.
What can't be upgraded?
Ask suppliers when they will support ML-KEM. BSI strongly recommends that products expected to run beyond 2030 can be upgraded to quantum-safe methods5.
TLS baseline
- Offer TLS 1.3 and 1.2 only. BSI prefers TLS 1.3, recommends TLS 1.2 only until the end of 2031 and doesn't recommend TLS 1.0 or 1.16.
- Put hybrid groups first. List
X25519MLKEM768ahead ofX25519, as OpenSSL 3.5 does by default14. Recent Windows 11 and Server 2025 builds support it in Schannel but leave it off; enable it with the ECC Curve Order group policy15. On AWS load balancers, pickELBSecurityPolicy-TLS13-1-2-Res-PQ-2025-0916. - Meet BSI key lengths. Prefer ECDSA P-256 keys. BSI wants RSA keys of at least 3000 bits, so the usual RSA 2048 falls short6.
Who holds the keys
- Encryption at rest stops disk thieves, not logins. It protects against someone with the hardware but not the key18. S3 decrypts for any authenticated request with permission23.
- Platform-managed keys suit most data, Microsoft says18. Choose customer-managed keys for specific regulatory or security needs; their availability becomes your job.
- Make deletion slow and keep backups. Turn on Key Vault soft delete and purge protection, back up keys that can't be recreated and test the restore17.
What changed in 2026
- A certificate authority lost its keys. In October 2026 eight eMudhra intermediate CA keys proved recoverable. Mozilla dropped trust in eMudhra's emSign ECC Root CA - G3 and Chrome committed to do the same4. Update the trust store in every runtime and image, and keep a second ACME CA ready.
- Public certificates are becoming server-only. Chrome requires public certificates issued from 15 March 2027 to be for server authentication only3. Move mutual TLS to a private CA.
- BSI and NIST set end dates for classical cryptography in TR-02102 2026-01 and the final IR 8547 (dates below)510.
Dates that set your schedule
What you can skip
- Re-keying everything to AES-256 for quantum. NIST believes approved symmetric algorithms with at least 128-bit security meet its lowest post-quantum security category10. Use AES-256 for new long-term secrets, as BSI advises5.
- Post-quantum TLS certificates now. Classical signatures stay trustworthy until a quantum computer exists, and BSI recommends them until the end of 20355. Firmware signing can't wait that long8.
- Cloud keys in an external key store. AWS says their availability and latency risks exceed the perceived benefit for most customers22.
- Rotating KMS keys more than yearly. Wrapping keys are almost never used enough to wear out21.
Mistakes that cost the most
- Deleting a key something still uses. A deleted AWS KMS key leaves its data unrecoverable. Disable it first and alarm on use during the 7 to 30 day waiting period20.
- Trusting infrastructure-as-code defaults. AWS load balancer listeners created from the CLI, CloudFormation or CDK without a named policy get
ELBSecurityPolicy-2016-08, which allows TLS 1.0 and 1.116. - Turning off post-quantum key exchange for a middlebox. Firefox warns this removes protection against later decryption of recorded traffic12, and Chrome's policy to do so ended with version 14611. Fix the middlebox.
What this looks like at your size
Small team, no security staff
- Use your host's or CDN's managed certificates, or an ACME client with ARI, and turn on expiry alerts.
- Keep the cloud's default encryption, and keep passwords and API keys in a vault, not in code.
- Ask your IT provider and SaaS vendors when they will support hybrid post-quantum TLS.
Growing, with IT or security staff
- Build the inventory from load balancer logs, certificate transparency and config scans; give every certificate and key an owner.
- Enable hybrid ML-KEM on internet-facing TLS and SSH, and watch logs for clients that fall back.
- Run a private CA for client certificates and put key admin roles behind just-in-time access.
Enterprise or regulated
- Write the cryptography policy NIS2 requires. For cloud and other digital providers, Regulation 2024/2690 sets its content, from algorithms to key destruction24.
- Keep the inventory in a standard format such as CBOM8 and report quantum risk to the board.
- Start with the PKI, the slowest to migrate, and put PQC support into supplier contracts.