This sheet is past its review date. Deadlines or advice may have changed since 5 Nov 2026.
OT and industrial systems: what if you can't patch or reboot?
This month, close port forwards and modems that reach your controllers from the internet, put vendor access behind your own gateway with MFA, and change every default or shared password. Then route remote access through one broker in the OT DMZ, keep verified offline copies of controller logic and rehearse running the plant by hand.
If you only do five things
Change every default and shared password.
Attackers used default accounts at over 30 Polish wind and solar sites in December 2025; password reuse across sites is common3.
Put all remote access through one broker.
One gateway in the OT DMZ, with phishing-resistant MFA and enabled per job, replaces per-vendor VPNs5 and stray modems.
Build an inventory you can act on
Walk the plant, not just the network.
Combine a physical inspection with network data and documents7. Modems and gateways often show an antenna or a Gateway label1.
Listen before you scan.
Passive discovery adds no traffic. Active scans can make devices unstable, so schedule them for planned outages where possible8.
Collect the fields that matter.
CISA and eight partner agencies rank 14 attributes high priority, such as criticality, protocols, ports, accounts and logging7. Add firmware, last backup and remote access path.
Rank by consequence, keep it current.
Classify assets by what their failure would do to operations and safety, group them into zones, and update the list whenever a device is added or removed, even in emergencies7.
Protect what you can't patch
- Split the deadlines. Remote access gateways rarely affect real-time control, so patch them promptly9, within the patching sheet's deadlines. Patch PLCs in planned downtime unless a flaw is known exploited2, and test first10.
- Wrap obsolete devices. Put a current protocol gateway or hardened jump host in front, and log every interaction5.
- Use the protection you have. Validate the logic, then lock mode switches in RUN2; allow programming only from named engineering workstations10. No Polish RTU with signed firmware support had it on3.
- Switch off what you don't use. Disable unused web servers, FTP, Telnet and VNC210. A relay's default FTP account let attackers delete its system files3.
Monitoring that understands OT
- Watch passively. Feed SPAN ports or taps at the OT boundary8 and in the control network into ICS-aware intrusion detection10. On a small site, Malcolm shows which devices connect out1.
- Alert on changes to the process. Flag program downloads, mode changes, controller writes, and programming from non-engineering machines or outside change windows210.
- Tie alerts to work orders. Tell the SOC about maintenance windows, and make any break-glass login its top alarm5.
- Get logs off the devices. The Polish attackers factory-reset firewalls, erasing their logs3. Forward gateway, firewall, modem and HMI logs.
When something looks wrong on the plant
Make the process safe, then suspect an attack.
Operations decides on manual operation or shutdown. A Polish CHP plant took an attack for a contractor's error4.
Isolate in stages.
Revoke one vendor's access, or isolate the site and keep only the flows your plan exempts5. Do it before restoring: a Polish CHP plant restored with the attacker still inside4.
Check the logic before you restart.
Compare programs and backups with known-good logic, and reimage what the attacker reached2.
Engineering access and safety systems
- Dedicate engineering workstations. Use application allowlisting10, and keep them in OT with no email or web access.
- Control media and laptops. Use registered company media, scan it on a station with a different operating system, block unused USB ports and quarantine contractor laptops11.
- Keep safety systems separate. Combined control and safety networks could give an attacker both; keep safety keys in RUN unless programming8. F-series safety CPUs are among the Siemens targets10.
Suppliers and products
- Buy secure by default. Require the 12 Secure by Demand elements, such as no default passwords; they align with IEC 62443-4-2 Security Level 312.
- Contract the remote access. Integrators use your broker, add no modems, list who has access and hand over an inventory and backups15. If you cut remote access, they come on site5.
- Mind 2027. The CRA's main obligations apply from 11 December 202713. Under the Machinery Regulation, machines placed on the market from 20 January 2027 must be protected against corruption14.
What regulators expect in Germany
- Treat plant systems as in scope. For NIS2 entities, § 30 BSIG covers the IT systems, components and processes used to provide their services16. Energy grid and plant operators under §§ 5c to 5e EnWG follow the EnWG instead16. Reporting is in the EU security laws sheet.
- Critical facilities need attack detection. § 31 BSIG requires it16, BSI's pre-NIS2 guidance includes OT17, and operators prove their measures to the BSI every 3 years16.
- BSI calls exposed OT a breach of duty. It says operators who expose OT to the internet without adequate protection breach their duties1.
What changed in 2026
- Destructive attacks reached EU energy. On 29 December 2025, attackers damaged controllers at over 30 Polish wind and solar sites and hit two CHP plants, one through a private APN34. Audit your APNs4.
- PLC attacks now target safety logic. AA26-097A's July 2026 update describes a malicious project file that overrode logic keeping a process within safe limits2.
- Attackers use AI to write PLC exploits. The NSA-led AA26-231A (August 2026) describes AI-generated scripts that read and write Siemens S7 memory. Block TCP port 102 at the perimeter10.
- BSI set a baseline for small plants in October 2026: no direct internet access, secured remote access, current software, routine checks1.
What you can skip
- Active scans of a running plant. Test the tool offline and schedule scans for planned outages where possible8.
- Emergency patching every ICS advisory. Fix exposed and known exploited flaws first; the rest can wait for planned downtime2.
- Agents the vendor hasn't approved. Measures must not cost you warranty or support11.
- Anomaly detection instead of blocking. The NCSC says it must not replace disabling unused commands, services and ports5.
Mistakes that cost the most
- Calling a VLAN isolation. Many Polish sites had separate VLANs, but the attacker held admin rights on the firewall that joined them3.
- Letting one domain reach everything. At the large Polish CHP plant, attackers with privileged domain accounts pushed a wiper through Group Policy; EDR stopped it3. The segmentation sheet covers a separate OT identity.
- Assuming the integrator handled it. Owners whose providers have remote access may not know their PLCs are exposed10.
What this looks like at your size
Small team, no security staff
Growing, with IT or security staff
- Build the inventory with CISA's fields and a passive sensor at the IT/OT boundary.
- Replace vendor VPNs and modems with one broker, enabled per job.
- Back up logic after every change and test a restore on a spare each quarter.