This sheet is past its review date. Deadlines or advice may have changed since 5 Nov 2026.
Payment fraud: could one convincing email, call or video call move your money?
This quarter, write down how bank details may change (a call back to a number you already have, a second approver and a waiting period before the first payment) and have your bank require two signatures for payments. Then run Verification of Payee on your payment files too, and treat any request to skip the process as fraud, however senior the voice or face.
If you only do five things
Write down how bank details change, and let the system enforce it.
Accept new or changed bank details for suppliers and staff only after a call back to a number you held before the request and approval by a second person, then wait two business days before the first payment. In Dynamics 365 Finance, turn on the vendor bank account change proposal workflow and don't let imports use Allow changes without approval, which skips it9.
Require two people for large payments, at the bank too.
Above an amount you set, a second person approves in the ERP and a second signature releases at the bank; the German banking industry recommends joint signing for EBICS7. Give ERP and payment servers only a transport signature (T), which uploads files but can't authorize them8.
Verify unusual requests outside the channel they came in.
Fake executives start on email or WhatsApp and follow up on video calls built from public footage1516. Call back on a known number, agree code words for critical transactions17 and agree that nobody is blamed for making the board wait while they check7.
Prepare the first hour.
Keep the bank's fraud line and who may call it on paper. The FBI's recovery team froze 58% of the $1.16 billion it tried to stop in 2025 and says time is of the essence10.
The first hour after a fraudulent transfer
Call your bank's fraud line.
Use the number from your contract or the bank's website. Ask for a recall with the reason fraud, which the bank can send once per payment3, and for a freeze at the receiving bank. Transfers, instant or not, generally can't be revoked, and getting money back depends on the recipient's consent5, so every minute counts.
Stop the follow-ups.
In a Singapore case the fraudsters came back for another US$1.4 million; the bank's quick alert let police hold the US$494,000 already moved to Hong Kong16. Block the receiving IBAN, hold open payment runs, block EBICS users whose keys may be exposed and tell the bank7.
Report it to the police.
In Germany, use the state police cybercrime contact point (ZAC) listed in the incident response sheet. For transfers to US banks, also file at ic3.gov with the full transaction details, whatever the amount10.
Keep the evidence.
Save the emails as files with headers, chat messages, call logs, invoices, VoP results and bank confirmations before anyone deletes or resets anything. If a real mailbox sent the request, follow the incident response sheet.
Warn whoever is next.
Tell the supplier or employee whose details were faked, and your insurer: this is usually a fidelity insurance claim, not a cyber claim17 (see the cyber insurance sheet).
How companies lose the money
- CEO fraud, now with deepfakes. A Hong Kong employee paid about HK$200 million into five accounts after a group video call in which a pre-recorded deepfake of the UK head office's CFO gave instructions15. A voice can be cloned from a few minutes of recordings, often public ones17, and Europol says AI makes BEC and CEO fraud more realistic14.
- Fake invoices and changed bank details. Microsoft counted over 46 million attacks posing as executives, staff, suppliers or partners in a year, and one in four impersonation emails pushes the victim to a phone call12.
- Payroll diversion. Attackers pose as employees and ask HR to change the salary account; 51% of the attempts Microsoft saw landed on a Monday or Tuesday12. Others take over the employee's own login: Storm-2657 changed salary bank details in Workday and hid the alert emails with inbox rules13.
What Verification of Payee does and doesn't do
- It checks name against IBAN. The payee's bank reports a match, a close match with the registered name, no match or no check possible2. Euro area banks had to offer it free by 9 October 2025 (later joiners within a year), the rest of the EU by 9 July 20271.
- It never blocks. You can pay after a warning, and a bank that ran the check correctly isn't liable1.
- Opted-out files lose it. Non-consumers may opt out for payment packages1; BaFin tolerates it, for now, even for EBICS files with one payment4.
- A match is not proof. It can't detect a fraudulent payee or request5.
- Register your trading names. Ask your bank to store them as extra payee names, which BaFin allows4, so customers see a match, not a warning.
Set up the bank side
- Keep single signatures rare. EBICS has single (E), first (A), second (B) and transport-only (T) signatures8; give E to as few people as possible.
- Use chip cards, not key files. Malware can copy key files with their passwords7.
- Set limits that take time to raise. A limit on all online transfers may have a waiting period for increases; one on instant transfers alone must be changeable at any time4.
- Review signing rights against HR. Remove leavers and changed roles at the bank too7.
Who owns what
- Finance owns the process, not IT. The CFO or head of accounting owns the bank detail rule, signing rights, limits, VoP settings and exceptions.
- HR owns payroll changes. Confirm each by phone, including self-service changes in the HR system.
- IT protects the accounts. Passkeys, starting with finance, HR and executives (passkeys and MFA sheet), DMARC and BEC detection (endpoints and email sheet), alerts on new inbox rules13.
- Management backs the no. No exceptions requested by phone or chat.
What changed in 2026
- BEC losses rose again. Victims reported $3.05 billion to the FBI in 2025, up from $2.77 billion, including over $30 million in BEC involving AI10.
- Microsoft now tracks business contact impersonation. It saw a 121% surge in April 2026; most first messages were bland small talk12.
- EU data shows who pays. Tricked payers caused 74% of credit transfer fraud by value in 2024, up from 65%, and customers bore about 85% of credit transfer losses11.
What you can skip
- Spotting deepfakes, by tool or by ear. The GDV calls the cues unreliable and says checking the request itself holds up better than judging picture or sound17. Teach the call back instead (security awareness sheet).
- Call backs on every routine payment. Spend them on new payees, changed details and unusual requests.
- Paid name checks for euro payments. Verification of Payee is free1.
Mistakes that cost the most
- Calling the number in the request. Call one you already knew17.
- Paying through a no match. After a warning the loss is usually yours111. Stop until the call back.
- Letting secrecy beat the process. The Singapore fraud used a fake lawyer, a confidential restructuring and a nondisclosure agreement16.
- Confirming changes to the same mailbox. Attackers who control it delete the confirmation13. Use phone or letter.
What this looks like at your size
Small team, no security staff
- Write a one-page payment rule: call back on a known number, a second person for bank detail changes, no exceptions for the owner.
- Ask your bank how a second person can release online payments, and set a daily limit.
- Tell customers how you would announce new bank details.
Growing, with IT or security staff
- Enforce bank detail approval in the ERP and HR system, and close import paths that bypass it.
- Switch payment runs to the order types that run VoP, and route each no match to a second person.
- Alert on supplier and payroll bank changes and on new inbox rules in finance and HR mailboxes.
Enterprise or regulated
- Run treasury payments through EBICS with chip cards, A and B signatures and T-only server users.
- With the CEO's consent, have someone pose as them on video and check that finance calls back before paying.
- Report attempts and losses to the audit committee.