Privileged access: who could take over everything today?

This quarter, find every account, app and server that can control Active Directory or Entra ID, and cut it to a few dedicated admin accounts that hold their roles only while activated. Guard the sync servers, certificate authorities and apps that can change those accounts as strictly as the accounts.

Reviewed
Next review
Version
1.0
Written for
IT and security teams running Active Directory, Microsoft Entra ID or both, with Azure and Microsoft 365 admin roles

If you only do five things

  1. Find out who holds Tier 0 today.

    List AD admin group members, holders of Entra roles marked PRIVILEGED, and the apps and servers that can change them. Microsoft calls excessive privilege one of its most common findings1.

  2. Cut standing admin rights.

    Keep fewer than five Global Administrators, including two emergency accounts, and fewer than ten privileged role assignments2. Keep day-to-day accounts out of Domain and Enterprise Admins3.

  3. Make the rest time-limited.

    In Entra Privileged Identity Management (PIM), make roles eligible, not active, so admins activate them for 1 to 24 hours4. Require approval for Global Administrator5.

  4. Guard what controls the admins.

    Microsoft counts PAM tools, jump hosts, automation and apps with privileged roles as Tier 06, and the Entra Connect server too7. Treat certificate authorities and device management the same way.

  5. Alert on every change to Tier 0.

    Send alerts where admins can't close them: Storm-2885 used a privileged cloud identity to close alerts8.

Find everyone who can take over

  1. Who is in the AD admin groups?

    Export the nested members of every group AdminSDHolder protects, including Account, Backup, Server and Print Operators9. Most should be empty.

  2. Who holds privileged Entra roles?

    In Roles & admins, filter on Privileged and count active and eligible assignments, including through groups65. Add Azure subscription admins and Microsoft 365 roles managed outside Entra ID10.

  3. Which apps act as admins?

    List service principals with Entra roles or with Graph permissions such as RoleManagement.ReadWrite.Directory or AppRoleAssignment.ReadWrite.All, which let an app grant more privileges to itself or anyone else11. Add each app's owners, who can act as the app24.

  4. Which servers and tools control them?

    Add domain controllers, sync servers, certificate authorities, AD FS, and the hypervisors, backups and device management that reach them.

Tier 0 in Entra ID and the cloud

  • Treat three more roles like Global Administrator. Privileged Authentication Administrators can reset its password6, Privileged Role Administrators assign roles10, and Conditional Access Administrators can remove the checks on PIM activation4.
  • Use cloud-only admin accounts. A compromised synced account can compromise Entra ID too2. Keep Tier 0 AD accounts out of sync10.
  • Ask for more at activation. Point PIM at a Conditional Access authentication context with a phishing-resistant authentication strength and sign-in frequency Every time4.
  • Give apps certificates or managed identities. Microsoft prefers them to client secrets16, which CISA's baseline says to block5.
  • Count device management as Tier 0. After the March 2026 attack on Stryker, CISA urged least-privilege Intune roles and Multi Admin Approval for wipes and changes to apps, scripts and roles17.

Paths between on-premises and cloud

  • Harden the sync server as Tier 0. Whoever controls an Entra Connect or Cloud Sync server can change Entra users, for example reset their passwords, so require MFA for every admin718.
  • Turn off matching you don't need. Disable soft matching and hard match takeover, so an AD object can't take over a cloud account7.
  • Watch cloud tools that reach back. Intune and similar tools run code on managed devices. Storm-2885 used Intune to deploy scripts and open tunnels into on-premises environments8.

Alert on these changes

  • AD admin groups. Events 4728, 4732 and 4756 log a member added to a global, local or universal security group19.
  • AdminSDHolder, GPOs and SID history. Audit directory service changes: 5136 logs a changed object, 4765 SID history added to an account19.
  • Entra roles and Azure. Add member to role and Add eligible member to role16, each Global Administrator activation5 and elevated access to Azure20.
  • Apps. Add app role assignment to service principal for Microsoft Graph, Add owner to application and new app credentials16.

What changed in 2026

  • Entra ID blocks hard-match takeover of admins. Since July 2026, sync can't hard-match onto a cloud user who holds or is eligible for a privileged role21.
  • Entra Connect Sync needs a certificate. Run 2.6.84.0 or later with application-based authentication by 7 April 2027, or sync stops7.
  • Domain controllers stopped assuming RC4. Since April 2026 they assume AES for accounts without explicit encryption types, and July 2026 updates remove the rollback. Check KDCSVC events 201 to 209 for accounts still on RC4, whose tickets can be cracked offline22.

What you can skip

  • A separate admin forest. Microsoft now treats the red forest (ESAE) as a custom configuration for exception cases, such as disconnected environments1. Its PAWs, MFA and least privilege still apply.
  • A password vault before cutting rights. Vaulting the passwords of 30 Domain Admins still leaves 30 Domain Admins. Shrink the list first.
  • PAWs for everyone in IT. Give full PAWs, with no email or web browsing, to Tier 0 admins. Others can use hardened devices without local admin rights.

Mistakes that cost the most

  • Letting PIM licenses lapse. Eligible assignments disappear and time-bound active ones become permanent23.
  • Requiring approval with no active admins. Name approvers and keep emergency accounts active, or no one can approve and you're locked out4.
  • Running services as Domain Admins. Kerberoasting is a common issue with service accounts15, so one weak password can hand over the domain.
  • Leaving Azure elevated access on. Deactivating Global Administrator in PIM leaves it on20.

What this looks like at your size

Small team, no security staff

  • Keep two emergency accounts and at most two named, cloud-only Global Administrators.
  • Business Premium includes Entra ID P1, not P2: buy P2 only for admins and PIM approvers23.
  • Ask your IT provider which accounts it uses, and drop the deprecated Partner Tier1 and Tier2 roles6.

Growing, with IT or security staff

  • Put every Entra role in PIM, with approval for Global Administrator and alerts on each activation.
  • Give Tier 0 admins PAWs on a management subnet, as the network segmentation sheet describes.
  • Review apps with Graph write permissions, and their owners, every quarter.

Enterprise or regulated

  • Run quarterly access reviews of Tier 0, licensed for reviewers and reviewed users23.
  • Put Defender for Identity sensors on AD CS servers: several certificate checks need them13.
  • Twice a year, add a test account to Domain Admins and an Entra role, and time the alert.