This sheet is past its review date. Deadlines or advice may have changed since 4 Nov 2026.
Privileged access: who could take over everything today?
This quarter, find every account, app and server that can control Active Directory or Entra ID, and cut it to a few dedicated admin accounts that hold their roles only while activated. Guard the sync servers, certificate authorities and apps that can change those accounts as strictly as the accounts.
If you only do five things
Find out who holds Tier 0 today.
List AD admin group members, holders of Entra roles marked PRIVILEGED, and the apps and servers that can change them. Microsoft calls excessive privilege one of its most common findings1.
Alert on every change to Tier 0.
Send alerts where admins can't close them: Storm-2885 used a privileged cloud identity to close alerts8.
Find everyone who can take over
Who is in the AD admin groups?
Export the nested members of every group AdminSDHolder protects, including Account, Backup, Server and Print Operators9. Most should be empty.
Who holds privileged Entra roles?
In Roles & admins, filter on Privileged and count active and eligible assignments, including through groups65. Add Azure subscription admins and Microsoft 365 roles managed outside Entra ID10.
Which apps act as admins?
List service principals with Entra roles or with Graph permissions such as
RoleManagement.ReadWrite.DirectoryorAppRoleAssignment.ReadWrite.All, which let an app grant more privileges to itself or anyone else11. Add each app's owners, who can act as the app24.Which servers and tools control them?
Add domain controllers, sync servers, certificate authorities, AD FS, and the hypervisors, backups and device management that reach them.
Tier 0 in Active Directory
- Keep top admins off other machines. Deny Domain Admins all sign-in to member servers and workstations by Group Policy, except DC jump servers3.
- Put admins in Protected Users. Members can't use NTLM, RC4, delegation or offline sign-in, and their Kerberos TGTs last four hours. Test first, add admins in stages and never add service or computer accounts12.
- Watch AdminSDHolder. SDProp copies its permissions to every protected account and group hourly9, so one added permission reaches all admins.
- Fix certificate templates. A template any user can enroll in, with Supply in the request and client authentication, lets them take over any user, even a domain admin. It's a common misconfiguration13, and Mandiant saw attackers abuse AD CS templates to create admin accounts14.
- Replace service account passwords. gMSA passwords rotate automatically; Windows Server 2025 dMSAs also bind to named machines and help prevent Kerberoasting15.
Tier 0 in Entra ID and the cloud
- Treat three more roles like Global Administrator. Privileged Authentication Administrators can reset its password6, Privileged Role Administrators assign roles10, and Conditional Access Administrators can remove the checks on PIM activation4.
- Use cloud-only admin accounts. A compromised synced account can compromise Entra ID too2. Keep Tier 0 AD accounts out of sync10.
- Ask for more at activation. Point PIM at a Conditional Access authentication context with a phishing-resistant authentication strength and sign-in frequency Every time4.
- Give apps certificates or managed identities. Microsoft prefers them to client secrets16, which CISA's baseline says to block5.
- Count device management as Tier 0. After the March 2026 attack on Stryker, CISA urged least-privilege Intune roles and Multi Admin Approval for wipes and changes to apps, scripts and roles17.
Paths between on-premises and cloud
- Harden the sync server as Tier 0. Whoever controls an Entra Connect or Cloud Sync server can change Entra users, for example reset their passwords, so require MFA for every admin718.
- Turn off matching you don't need. Disable soft matching and hard match takeover, so an AD object can't take over a cloud account7.
- Watch cloud tools that reach back. Intune and similar tools run code on managed devices. Storm-2885 used Intune to deploy scripts and open tunnels into on-premises environments8.
Alert on these changes
- AD admin groups. Events 4728, 4732 and 4756 log a member added to a global, local or universal security group19.
- AdminSDHolder, GPOs and SID history. Audit directory service changes: 5136 logs a changed object, 4765 SID history added to an account19.
- Entra roles and Azure. Add member to role and Add eligible member to role16, each Global Administrator activation5 and elevated access to Azure20.
- Apps. Add app role assignment to service principal for Microsoft Graph, Add owner to application and new app credentials16.
What changed in 2026
- Entra ID blocks hard-match takeover of admins. Since July 2026, sync can't hard-match onto a cloud user who holds or is eligible for a privileged role21.
- Entra Connect Sync needs a certificate. Run 2.6.84.0 or later with application-based authentication by 7 April 2027, or sync stops7.
- Domain controllers stopped assuming RC4. Since April 2026 they assume AES for accounts without explicit encryption types, and July 2026 updates remove the rollback. Check KDCSVC events 201 to 209 for accounts still on RC4, whose tickets can be cracked offline22.
What you can skip
- A separate admin forest. Microsoft now treats the red forest (ESAE) as a custom configuration for exception cases, such as disconnected environments1. Its PAWs, MFA and least privilege still apply.
- A password vault before cutting rights. Vaulting the passwords of 30 Domain Admins still leaves 30 Domain Admins. Shrink the list first.
- PAWs for everyone in IT. Give full PAWs, with no email or web browsing, to Tier 0 admins. Others can use hardened devices without local admin rights.
Mistakes that cost the most
- Letting PIM licenses lapse. Eligible assignments disappear and time-bound active ones become permanent23.
- Requiring approval with no active admins. Name approvers and keep emergency accounts active, or no one can approve and you're locked out4.
- Running services as Domain Admins. Kerberoasting is a common issue with service accounts15, so one weak password can hand over the domain.
- Leaving Azure elevated access on. Deactivating Global Administrator in PIM leaves it on20.
What this looks like at your size
Small team, no security staff
Growing, with IT or security staff
- Put every Entra role in PIM, with approval for Global Administrator and alerts on each activation.
- Give Tier 0 admins PAWs on a management subnet, as the network segmentation sheet describes.
- Review apps with Graph write permissions, and their owners, every quarter.