# Secure development: which practices prevent vulnerabilities, and can you prove it?

This quarter, publish a vulnerability disclosure policy with a security.txt contact, block secrets at push and make review plus one precise static analysis check required before merge. Judge every other practice by whether it removes a whole class of bug by default or leaves evidence that a customer or regulator can check.

Version 1.2. Reviewed 5 Nov 2026, next review 5 Dec 2026.
Latest version: https://sheets.einblick.dev/secure-development/

## If you only do five things

1. **Publish a disclosure policy and a contact.** Authorize good-faith testing, rule out legal action against it, give a reporting channel and allow coordinated publication[1]. Serve `/.well-known/security.txt` with `Contact`, `Policy` and an `Expires` date under a year away[2]. From December 2027, the CRA requires a disclosure policy and a contact address[3].
2. **Make the safe way the default way.** Cross-site scripting and SQL injection top the 2025 CWE Top 25[4]. Offer parameterized queries, auto-escaping templates and shell-free command APIs[1][5]. Write new components in memory-safe languages: memory safety bugs fell below 20% of Android's vulnerabilities in 2025[6].
3. **Block secrets before they reach the repository.** Turn on push protection everywhere. On GitHub, private repositories need Secret Protection for it[8]; on GitLab, it takes Ultimate[9]. Rotate leaked secrets at once[7], and load secrets from a secret manager, not code, images or environment variables[10].
4. **Require review and one precise scanner before merge.** On the default branch, require a pull request with one approval, **Require approval of the most recent reviewable push** and passing checks[11]. Run CodeQL's `default` suite[12] and block high and critical alerts with **Require code scanning results**[13].
5. **Fix by exploitation and publish what you fixed.** Ship fixes within 90 days of a report, or 7 once exploited, per Google Project Zero[14]. Issue a CVE with CWE and CPE for each critical or high flaw that's exploited or that users must patch[1].

## Handle a vulnerability report

1. **Is it real?** Acknowledge it within three business days and reproduce it before anyone spends a week. Expect volume: by April, curl got twice 2025's rate of reports, nearly all AI-assisted, and 15 to 16% were confirmed[15].
2. **Is it exploited?** Check CISA KEV, ENISA's EU KEV catalog[16] and your own logs. If it is and the product is on the EU market, send an early warning through ENISA's platform within 24 hours[3][18]. The EU security laws sheet has the later clocks.
3. **When does the fix ship?** Set the date by exploitation and exposure, then severity, and tell the reporter. On internet-facing services you run, an exploited flaw gets the patching sheet's 72 hours. If the fix will take longer, publish a workaround first[20]. Ship security fixes separately from feature updates where feasible, as the CRA requires[3].
4. **What do you publish?** An advisory with a CVE, a CVSS score and a CWE, crediting the reporter. NVD no longer routinely adds its own score where the CNA gave one[19], so your record is what customers see.
5. **Where else is the same bug?** Search for the pattern across the code base, add a regression test and a rule that catches the next one, as the SSDF advises[20]. The TypeScript, Rust and Python sheets list rules per language.

## Automated checks that earn their place

- **Secret scanning with push protection.** It covers Git history, issues and pull requests, and validity checks show which secrets still work[7].
- **Dependency scanning.** If a KEV-listed flaw in a component is exploitable in your product, CISA wants a free patch within 30 days of its fix[5].
- **SAST with a precise rule set.** Start with CodeQL's `default` suite, not the less precise `security-extended`[12]. Each month, tune out rules that are mostly false positives.
- **A DAST baseline in CI.** ZAP's baseline scan spiders for a minute and doesn't attack, so it can run against production[21].
- **Tests for what tools miss.** Tools can't fully verify access control[22], the top risk in the OWASP Top 10:2025[23]. Test that one user can't reach another's records.

## Before a risky change ships

- **Decide what counts as risky.** Authentication, authorization, payments, uploads, parsers and new interfaces get a threat model and a reviewer who knows security. The NCSC wants closer oversight of AI-written code that handles authentication, sensitive personal data or secrets[24].
- **Threat model it in half an hour.** Ask what you're working on, what can go wrong, what you'll do about it and whether you did a good enough job, with STRIDE's six categories as prompts[25]. Keep the answers with the code.
- **Pick requirements from ASVS 5.0.** Level 1 holds about 20% of some 350 requirements, and most applications should aim for Level 2[26]. Cite them with the version, as in `v5.0.0-1.2.5`[26].
- **Ship secure defaults.** No shared default passwords, MFA on for admins and logs for customers[5]. The CRA requires a secure default configuration and a reset[3].

## Evidence customers and regulators ask for

- **Answers to buyers' standard questions.** CISA's Secure by Demand guide tells buyers to ask for a disclosure policy, CVEs with CWE and CPE fields, a plan to end vulnerability classes, an SBOM and MFA by default[27].
- **A mapping to SSDF 1.1.** Name the task each practice meets, such as PW.7.2 for code review[20]. US agencies may still ask for the attestation form, though it's no longer required[28].
- **CRA technical documentation.** Keep the risk assessment current and the documentation for 10 years or the support period, if longer. SaaS that isn't remote data processing for a product is outside the CRA[3].

## What changed in 2026

- **CRA reporting started.** Since 11 September, manufacturers must report actively exploited vulnerabilities through ENISA's platform[18]. The Commission's draft guidance of 27 July explains scope, remote data processing and support periods[29].
- **AI finds flaws at scale.** The NCSC expects a forced correction of technical debt and an influx of updates of every severity[30]. Plan who fixes the findings before you scan with a model.
- **EU vendors can issue CVEs under ENISA.** ENISA, a CVE Root since November 2025, had 20 CNAs by August, vendors among them[17].

## What you can skip

- **A paid bug bounty before you can triage.** curl ended its bounty in early 2026 after a flood of AI-written junk reports[15]. A disclosure policy is free.
- **Black-box penetration tests.** OWASP favors source-led tests, and it certifies no one for ASVS[22].
- **Rewriting history after a leak.** Revoke the secret. GitHub calls scrubbing history time-consuming and often unnecessary[7].
- **Waiting for SSDF 1.2.** NIST's December 2025 draft adds continuous improvement and staged updates with rollback[31]. Map to 1.1 now.

## Mistakes that cost the most

- **Fixing silently.** Customers can't tell they need the update, and the CRA requires public information on fixed vulnerabilities[3].
- **Letting security.txt expire.** `Expires` is required[2]. Put its renewal in the release calendar.
- **Merging AI-written code nobody read.** Review, understand and check it where the stakes are high[24]. Require approval from someone other than the person who prompted the agent.

## What this looks like at your size

### Small team, no security staff

- Turn on Dependabot, push protection and CodeQL. Private GitHub repos need the Team plan or higher, with paid Secret Protection and Code Security[8][11].
- Publish security.txt with a mailbox two people read, and require one review before merge.
- Keep one list of open flaws with ship dates.

### Growing, with IT or security staff

- Name a product security owner and write playbooks for zero-days and exploited flaws[20].
- Threat model risky changes and take ASVS Level 2 for internet-facing apps.
- Add a ZAP baseline scan against staging and report time to fix monthly.

### Enterprise or regulated

- Become a CNA, under ENISA's Root if it covers you[17], and publish CVEs with CWE and CPE.
- Keep CRA technical documentation per product, with risk assessment and vulnerability records.
- Fork ASVS into an internal standard naming your approved libraries[26].


## Version history

- 5 Nov 2026, version 1.2: Clarified that the CRA requires a disclosure policy and a contact address, not security.txt as such.
- 5 Nov 2026, version 1.1: Reviewed for company readers: private GitHub repositories need the Team plan or higher for these checks.
- 4 Nov 2026, version 1.0: Published after a copy edit and a source-by-source fact check, which updated the curl figures and narrowed 12 statements to what the sources say.
- 4 Nov 2026, version 0.1: First draft, based on NIST SSDF, CISA Secure by Design, OWASP ASVS 5.0, the CRA, RFC 9116, NCSC guidance and GitHub docs.

## Sources

1. Secure by Design Pledge. CISA, checked 4 Nov 2026. https://www.cisa.gov/securebydesign/pledge
2. RFC 9116: security.txt. IETF, Apr 2022. https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9116.html
3. Regulation (EU) 2024/2847 (Cyber Resilience Act), Articles 3, 13, 14 and 71, recital 12 and Annex I. EUR-Lex, 2024. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/2847/oj
4. 2025 CWE Top 25. MITRE, updated 15 Dec 2025. https://cwe.mitre.org/top25/archive/2025/2025_cwe_top25.html
5. Product Security Bad Practices v2. CISA and FBI, 17 Jan 2025. https://www.cisa.gov/resources-tools/resources/product-security-bad-practices
6. Rust in Android: move fast and fix things. Google, 13 Nov 2025. https://blog.google/security/rust-in-android-move-fast-fix-things/
7. Secret scanning. GitHub Docs, checked 4 Nov 2026. https://docs.github.com/en/code-security/concepts/secret-security/secret-scanning
8. About GitHub Advanced Security. GitHub Docs, checked 4 Nov 2026. https://docs.github.com/en/get-started/learning-about-github/about-github-advanced-security
9. Secret push protection. GitLab Docs, checked 4 Nov 2026. https://docs.gitlab.com/user/application_security/secret_detection/secret_push_protection/
10. Secrets Management Cheat Sheet. OWASP, checked 4 Nov 2026. https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Secrets_Management_Cheat_Sheet.html
11. Available rules for rulesets. GitHub Docs, checked 4 Nov 2026. https://docs.github.com/en/repositories/configuring-branches-and-merges-in-your-repository/managing-rulesets/available-rules-for-rulesets
12. CodeQL query suites. GitHub Docs, checked 4 Nov 2026. https://docs.github.com/en/code-security/concepts/code-scanning/codeql/codeql-query-suites
13. Set code scanning merge protection. GitHub Docs, checked 4 Nov 2026. https://docs.github.com/en/code-security/how-tos/find-and-fix-code-vulnerabilities/manage-your-configuration/set-merge-protection
14. Vulnerability Disclosure Policy. Google Project Zero, checked 4 Nov 2026. https://projectzero.google/vulnerability-disclosure-policy.html
15. High-Quality Chaos. Daniel Stenberg (curl), 22 Apr 2026. https://daniel.haxx.se/blog/2026/04/22/high-quality-chaos/
16. Vulnerability Services. ENISA, checked 4 Nov 2026. https://www.enisa.europa.eu/topics/vulnerability-services
17. ENISA scales up its role in the CVE Program. ENISA, 6 Aug 2026. https://www.enisa.europa.eu/news/enisa-scales-up-its-role-in-the-cve-program
18. The CRA Single Reporting Platform is launched. ENISA, 11 Sep 2026. https://www.enisa.europa.eu/news/the-cra-single-reporting-platform-is-launched
19. NIST Updates NVD Operations to Address Record CVE Growth. NIST, 15 Apr 2026. https://www.nist.gov/node/1910421
20. SP 800-218, SSDF Version 1.1. NIST, Feb 2022. https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/sp/800/218/final
21. ZAP Baseline Scan. ZAP Docs, checked 4 Nov 2026. https://www.zaproxy.org/docs/docker/baseline-scan/
22. ASVS 5.0.0: Assessment and Certification. OWASP, 30 May 2025. https://github.com/OWASP/ASVS/blob/v5.0.0/5.0/en/0x04-Assessment_and_Certification.md
23. OWASP Top 10:2025, Introduction. OWASP, 2025. https://top10.owasp.org/2025/0x00_2025-Introduction/
24. The 'vibe coding spectrum' approach to AI-assisted software development. NCSC (UK), 18 Jun 2026. https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/blogs/the-vibe-coding-spectrum-approach-to-ai-assisted-software-development
25. Threat Modeling Cheat Sheet. OWASP, checked 4 Nov 2026. https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Threat_Modeling_Cheat_Sheet.html
26. ASVS 5.0.0: What is the ASVS. OWASP, 30 May 2025. https://github.com/OWASP/ASVS/blob/v5.0.0/5.0/en/0x03-What-is-the-ASVS.md
27. Secure by Demand Guide. CISA and FBI, Aug 2024. https://www.cisa.gov/resources-tools/resources/secure-demand-guide
28. M-26-05: Adopting a Risk-based Approach to Software and Hardware Security. OMB, 23 Jan 2026. https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2026/01/M-26-05-Adopting-a-Risk-based-Approach-to-Software-and-Hardware-Security.pdf
29. Commission guidance on the application of the CRA, C(2026) 5252. European Commission, 27 Jul 2026. https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/library/commission-publishes-new-guidance-support-timely-cyber-resilience-act-implementation
30. Preparing for a 'vulnerability patch wave'. NCSC (UK), 1 May 2026. https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/blogs/prepare-for-vulnerability-patch-wave
31. SP 800-218 Rev. 1, SSDF Version 1.2 (draft). NIST, 17 Dec 2025. https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/sp/800/218/r1/ipd
