# Wi-Fi and network access: can anyone with a password get onto your network?

Move staff Wi-Fi to EAP-TLS with a certificate on every managed device within six months, and give guests and devices that can't do 802.1X their own SSIDs and VLANs now. Judge every other measure by whether a stolen password, a copied MAC address or a laptop plugged into a meeting-room port still reaches more than the internet.

Version 1.1. Reviewed 5 Nov 2026, next review 5 Dec 2026.
Latest version: https://sheets.einblick.dev/wifi-nac/

## If you only do five things

1. **Give every device its own certificate.** Use EAP-TLS with device certificates from Intune, issued by Microsoft Cloud PKI or your own CA. The NCSC calls this the most effective way to control which devices join[1].
2. **Retire PEAP-MSCHAPv2.** A fake access point can capture the exchange and recover the password[5]. Credential Guard[6] and, since October 2026, Windows 11 24H2 and later[7] block its automatic sign-in.
3. **Make every client check the RADIUS server.** Set the trusted root and server names in each Wi-Fi profile, so users aren't asked to trust a certificate[8]. Under WPA3-Enterprise, Windows 11 stops if validation fails[10].
4. **Segment guests and devices without 802.1X.** Put guest Wi-Fi in its own VLAN with internet only: in 2026, researchers broke client isolation on every network they tested[11]. Limit devices known only by MAC address to what they need[2].
5. **Lock down wired ports in public areas.** Run 802.1X with MAC fallback on ports in meeting rooms and reception, and switch off unused ones. Avoid multi-host mode: one authorized client opens the port for all[12], so a hub lets others in[1].

## Move staff Wi-Fi to certificates

1. **List what connects where.** For each SSID and switch, note the device types and whether they support 802.1X. BSI bases NAC planning on a complete asset inventory[2].
2. **Choose the RADIUS server.** NPS accepts only certificates from an enterprise CA or mapped to an AD account[13] and lacks TLS 1.3[10], which hides device identities[20]. For devices joined only to Entra ID, use a cloud RADIUS service that trusts your Intune CA.
3. **Issue device certificates.** Deploy a trusted root profile and a SCEP profile, with key storage set to **Enroll to Trusted Platform Module (TPM) KSP, otherwise fail**. Hybrid-joined devices checked against AD need their SID in the SAN[14]. Cloud PKI needs a license on top of Intune Plan 1 or 2[15]; the encryption sheet covers private CAs.
4. **Deploy the Wi-Fi profile.** Choose EAP-TLS, the SCEP certificate and **Machine** authentication[8]; the mobile devices sheet covers phones. Turn on WPA3 where APs and clients support it: 6 GHz requires it[17], as does enterprise Wi-Fi 7 on Windows 11[18]. Intune's template lacks WPA3; import an XML profile[8][9].
5. **Run both, then remove the old network.** Move groups over while watching RADIUS logs. Then delete the PSK or PEAP network and its profiles.

## Run the RADIUS server as infrastructure

- **Place it in the management zone.** Accept requests only from access points, controllers and switches, and alert when RADIUS is down or request counts jump[2].
- **Harden RADIUS over UDP.** CVE-2024-3596 lets an attacker on the RADIUS network forge packets. On NPS, require Message-Authenticator from RADIUS clients once every switch and AP sends it; it's off by default[19].
- **Plan for RADIUS being down.** Keep existing sessions and reject new ones, or assign a fixed restricted VLAN. Depending on the switch, an outage otherwise blocks every port or opens them all[2].

## Printers, cameras, scanners and IoT

- **Use certificates where the device can.** Intune SCEP profiles support Wi-Fi on Android Enterprise dedicated devices, such as scanners[14].
- **Otherwise give each device its own key.** BSI allows shared identities only as justified exceptions[2]. Meraki's identity PSK without RADIUS gives each key its own policy, but no WPA3[21]. Use 20 or more characters[3].
- **Treat MAC authentication as a label.** It makes spoofing easy, so BSI wants such devices restricted to the minimum and profiled[2].
- **One SSID or VLAN per device class,** reaching only its server; see the network segmentation sheet.

## Rogue access points and evil twins

- **Use your access points as sensors.** NIST recommends continuous monitoring for rogue APs, unauthorized clients and impersonation[22].
- **Scan where sensors don't reach** at least quarterly, NIST suggests, and assess the whole WLAN yearly[22].
- **Ban unapproved access points.** BSI requires the ban in the usage policy[4].
- **Block bridging and unapproved dual connections,** as NIST advises[22]. APT28 used wired PCs in neighboring firms to join a target's Wi-Fi, which asked only for a password[23].

## Controllers and cloud dashboards

- **Sign in through your identity provider,** with phishing-resistant MFA, and keep one emergency local account. The edge devices sheet covers management interfaces.
- **Patch within the patching sheet's deadlines** and change the defaults: BSI requires new SSIDs, passwords and keys before use, and encrypted admin access only[3].
- **Log every change** centrally[2]; alert on new SSIDs, keys and RADIUS servers.
- **Mount access points out of reach.** A stolen AP can reveal the RADIUS secret or the network key[3].

## What changed in 2026

- **Windows ended automatic MS-CHAPv2 sign-in.** Updates from 13 October 2026 make Windows 11 24H2 and later block single sign-on with NTLMv1-derived credentials, so PEAP-MSCHAPv2 users must type their password. Setting `BlockNtlmv1SSO` to 0 is a temporary exception[7].
- **Cloud PKI is rolling into Microsoft 365 E5** from July 2026. Otherwise it's a US$2 per user per month add-on, paid yearly[16].
- **Client isolation proved leaky.** In February 2026, researchers bypassed it under WPA2 and WPA3, in home and enterprise networks; a separate guest VLAN blocked the attacks in their test[11].
- **Network access systems were exploited.** CISA listed UniFi OS flaws in June 2026 and a Cisco ISE flaw in September 2026 as exploited[24].

## What you can skip

- **Hidden SSIDs.** Apple says hiding the name neither conceals nor secures the network, and devices that search for it can give it away[26].
- **MAC allow-lists as access control.** BSI doesn't treat devices identified by MAC address as trusted[2].
- **A VPN over your own Wi-Fi.** BSI lists it only for high protection needs[3].
- **NAC posture checks before the basics.** BSI files compliance checks under high protection[2]. Check compliance in Conditional Access instead.

## Mistakes that cost the most

- **Letting users accept unknown servers.** With PEAP, that hands a fake AP a crackable response[5]. Validate the server and disable user prompts[8].
- **Deleting a leaver before retiring the device.** Intune SCEP and PKCS certificates stay valid; retire or wipe the device first[25].
- **Leaving `BlockNtlmv1SSO` at 0.** It reduces protection[7]; set an end date.
- **One network for staff, guests and devices.** BSI forbids WLANs that couple security zones[3].

## What this looks like at your size

### Small team, no security staff

- Ask your IT provider for EAP-TLS with Cloud PKI and cloud RADIUS instead of a staff password.
- Put guests on their own SSID and VLAN with internet only, and printers and cameras on another.
- Switch off network ports in meeting rooms and reception that nobody uses.

### Growing, with IT or security staff

- Put all managed devices on EAP-TLS; allow PEAP-MSCHAPv2 only as a named exception with an end date.
- Enable 802.1X with MAC fallback on access switches, public areas first.
- Turn on rogue AP detection and send RADIUS and controller logs to the SIEM.

### Enterprise or regulated

- Run redundant RADIUS servers in the management zone, separate for office and production[2].
- Consider MACsec on ports in public areas[2].
- In Germany, map controls to BSI NET.2.1, NET.2.2 and NET.3.4.


## Version history

- 5 Nov 2026, version 1.1: Added that Intune's Windows Wi-Fi template has no WPA3 setting, so WPA3-Enterprise needs an imported XML profile.
- 5 Nov 2026, version 1.0: Published after a copy edit and a source-by-source fact check, which narrowed the October 2026 Windows change to automatic sign-in on Windows 11 24H2 and later, made the Message-Authenticator step safe to roll out and replaced a vendor blog with Microsoft Learn.
- 5 Nov 2026, version 0.1: First draft, based on BSI IT-Grundschutz NET.2.1, NET.2.2 and NET.3.4, NIST SP 800-153, NCSC guidance, Microsoft Learn pages on Intune, Cloud PKI, NPS and Credential Guard, and Microsoft's October 2026 MS-CHAPv2 change.

## Sources

1. Shadow IT. NCSC (UK), reviewed 14 Aug 2026. https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/guidance/shadow-it
2. NET.3.4 Network Access Control. BSI IT-Grundschutz, Edition 2023. https://www.bsi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/DE/BSI/Grundschutz/IT-GS-Kompendium_Einzel_PDFs_2023/09_NET_Netze_und_Kommunikation/NET_3_4_Network_Access_Control_Edition_2023.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=3
3. NET.2.1 WLAN-Betrieb. BSI IT-Grundschutz, Edition 2023. https://www.bsi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/DE/BSI/Grundschutz/IT-GS-Kompendium_Einzel_PDFs_2023/09_NET_Netze_und_Kommunikation/NET_2_1_WLAN_Betrieb_Edition_2023.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=3
4. NET.2.2 WLAN-Nutzung. BSI IT-Grundschutz, Edition 2023. https://www.bsi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/DE/BSI/Grundschutz/IT-GS-Kompendium_Einzel_PDFs_2023/09_NET_Netze_und_Kommunikation/NET_2_2_WLAN_Nutzung_Edition_2023.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=3
5. Security Advisory 2876146 (PEAP-MS-CHAPv2). Microsoft, 4 Aug 2013. https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/security-updates/securityadvisories/2013/2876146
6. Credential Guard: considerations and known issues. Microsoft Learn, 23 Apr 2026. https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/identity-protection/credential-guard/considerations-known-issues
7. KB5066470: Manage NTLMv1 changes in Windows. Microsoft Support, updated 19 Oct 2026. https://support.microsoft.com/kb/5066470
8. Wi-Fi settings for Windows devices in Intune. Microsoft Learn, 15 May 2025. https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/intune/device-configuration/templates/ref-wifi-settings-windows
9. WiFi CSP. Microsoft Learn, 14 Oct 2026. https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/client-management/mdm/wifi-csp
10. EAP: What's changed in Windows 11. Microsoft Learn, 27 Jun 2024. https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/networking/technologies/extensible-authentication-protocol/windows-11-changes
11. AirSnitch: Demystifying and Breaking Client Isolation in Wi-Fi Networks. NDSS 2026, Feb 2026. https://www.ndss-symposium.org/ndss-paper/airsnitch-demystifying-and-breaking-client-isolation-in-wi-fi-networks/
12. Configuring IEEE 802.1x Port-Based Authentication. Cisco, 29 Sep 2022. https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/switches/lan/catalyst2960cx_3650cx/software/release/15-2_7_e/configuration_guide/b_1527e_consolidated_3560cx_2960cx_cg/m_sec_8021x_cg.html
13. Certificate templates for PEAP and EAP. Microsoft Learn, 16 Jan 2025. https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/networking/technologies/nps/nps-manage-cert-requirements
14. SCEP certificate profiles in Intune. Microsoft Learn, 26 Jun 2025. https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/intune/device-configuration/certificates/scep-profiles
15. Microsoft Cloud PKI for Intune. Microsoft Learn, 8 Sep 2026. https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/intune/cloud-pki/
16. Microsoft Intune plans and pricing. Microsoft, checked 5 Nov 2026. https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/microsoft-intune-pricing
17. WPA3 deployment options. Wi-Fi Alliance, Feb 2026. https://www.wi-fi.org/system/files/WPA3_Deployment_Options_Highlights_202602.pdf
18. Windows 11 security book: Network security. Microsoft Learn, 13 Nov 2025. https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/security/book/operating-system-security-network-security
19. KB5040268: Access-Request packets attack (CVE-2024-3596). Microsoft Support, updated 6 Aug 2024. https://support.microsoft.com/topic/a0e2f0b1-f200-4a7b-844f-48d1d5ab9e66
20. RFC 9190: EAP-TLS 1.3. IETF, Feb 2022. https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9190.html
21. IPSK Authentication without RADIUS. Cisco Meraki Documentation, checked 5 Nov 2026. https://documentation.meraki.com/Wireless/Design_and_Configure/Configuration_Guides/Encryption_and_Authentication/IPSK_Authentication_without_RADIUS
22. SP 800-153, Guidelines for Securing WLANs. NIST, Feb 2012. https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/sp/800/153/final
23. The Nearest Neighbor Attack. Volexity (threat research), 22 Nov 2024. https://www.volexity.com/blog/2024/11/22/the-nearest-neighbor-attack-how-a-russian-apt-weaponized-nearby-wi-fi-networks-for-covert-access/
24. Known Exploited Vulnerabilities Catalog. CISA, checked 5 Nov 2026. https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog
25. Remove SCEP or PKCS certificates in Intune. Microsoft Learn, 8 Apr 2024. https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/intune/device-configuration/certificates/remove-profiles
26. Recommended settings for Wi-Fi routers and access points. Apple Support, 14 Jul 2026. https://support.apple.com/en-us/102766
