This sheet is past its review date. Deadlines or advice may have changed since 5 Nov 2026.
Wi-Fi and network access: can anyone with a password get onto your network?
Move staff Wi-Fi to EAP-TLS with a certificate on every managed device within six months, and give guests and devices that can't do 802.1X their own SSIDs and VLANs now. Judge every other measure by whether a stolen password, a copied MAC address or a laptop plugged into a meeting-room port still reaches more than the internet.
If you only do five things
Give every device its own certificate.
Use EAP-TLS with device certificates from Intune, issued by Microsoft Cloud PKI or your own CA. The NCSC calls this the most effective way to control which devices join1.
Move staff Wi-Fi to certificates
List what connects where.
For each SSID and switch, note the device types and whether they support 802.1X. BSI bases NAC planning on a complete asset inventory2.
Choose the RADIUS server.
NPS accepts only certificates from an enterprise CA or mapped to an AD account13 and lacks TLS 1.310, which hides device identities20. For devices joined only to Entra ID, use a cloud RADIUS service that trusts your Intune CA.
Issue device certificates.
Deploy a trusted root profile and a SCEP profile, with key storage set to Enroll to Trusted Platform Module (TPM) KSP, otherwise fail. Hybrid-joined devices checked against AD need their SID in the SAN14. Cloud PKI needs a license on top of Intune Plan 1 or 215; the encryption sheet covers private CAs.
Deploy the Wi-Fi profile.
Choose EAP-TLS, the SCEP certificate and Machine authentication8; the mobile devices sheet covers phones. Turn on WPA3 where APs and clients support it: 6 GHz requires it17, as does enterprise Wi-Fi 7 on Windows 1118. Intune's template lacks WPA3; import an XML profile89.
Run both, then remove the old network.
Move groups over while watching RADIUS logs. Then delete the PSK or PEAP network and its profiles.
Run the RADIUS server as infrastructure
- Place it in the management zone. Accept requests only from access points, controllers and switches, and alert when RADIUS is down or request counts jump2.
- Harden RADIUS over UDP. CVE-2024-3596 lets an attacker on the RADIUS network forge packets. On NPS, require Message-Authenticator from RADIUS clients once every switch and AP sends it; it's off by default19.
- Plan for RADIUS being down. Keep existing sessions and reject new ones, or assign a fixed restricted VLAN. Depending on the switch, an outage otherwise blocks every port or opens them all2.
Printers, cameras, scanners and IoT
- Use certificates where the device can. Intune SCEP profiles support Wi-Fi on Android Enterprise dedicated devices, such as scanners14.
- Otherwise give each device its own key. BSI allows shared identities only as justified exceptions2. Meraki's identity PSK without RADIUS gives each key its own policy, but no WPA321. Use 20 or more characters3.
- Treat MAC authentication as a label. It makes spoofing easy, so BSI wants such devices restricted to the minimum and profiled2.
- One SSID or VLAN per device class, reaching only its server; see the network segmentation sheet.
Rogue access points and evil twins
- Use your access points as sensors. NIST recommends continuous monitoring for rogue APs, unauthorized clients and impersonation22.
- Scan where sensors don't reach at least quarterly, NIST suggests, and assess the whole WLAN yearly22.
- Ban unapproved access points. BSI requires the ban in the usage policy4.
- Block bridging and unapproved dual connections, as NIST advises22. APT28 used wired PCs in neighboring firms to join a target's Wi-Fi, which asked only for a password23.
Controllers and cloud dashboards
- Sign in through your identity provider, with phishing-resistant MFA, and keep one emergency local account. The edge devices sheet covers management interfaces.
- Patch within the patching sheet's deadlines and change the defaults: BSI requires new SSIDs, passwords and keys before use, and encrypted admin access only3.
- Log every change centrally2; alert on new SSIDs, keys and RADIUS servers.
- Mount access points out of reach. A stolen AP can reveal the RADIUS secret or the network key3.
What changed in 2026
- Windows ended automatic MS-CHAPv2 sign-in. Updates from 13 October 2026 make Windows 11 24H2 and later block single sign-on with NTLMv1-derived credentials, so PEAP-MSCHAPv2 users must type their password. Setting
BlockNtlmv1SSOto 0 is a temporary exception7. - Cloud PKI is rolling into Microsoft 365 E5 from July 2026. Otherwise it's a US$2 per user per month add-on, paid yearly16.
- Client isolation proved leaky. In February 2026, researchers bypassed it under WPA2 and WPA3, in home and enterprise networks; a separate guest VLAN blocked the attacks in their test11.
- Network access systems were exploited. CISA listed UniFi OS flaws in June 2026 and a Cisco ISE flaw in September 2026 as exploited24.
What you can skip
- Hidden SSIDs. Apple says hiding the name neither conceals nor secures the network, and devices that search for it can give it away26.
- MAC allow-lists as access control. BSI doesn't treat devices identified by MAC address as trusted2.
- A VPN over your own Wi-Fi. BSI lists it only for high protection needs3.
- NAC posture checks before the basics. BSI files compliance checks under high protection2. Check compliance in Conditional Access instead.
Mistakes that cost the most
- Letting users accept unknown servers. With PEAP, that hands a fake AP a crackable response5. Validate the server and disable user prompts8.
- Deleting a leaver before retiring the device. Intune SCEP and PKCS certificates stay valid; retire or wipe the device first25.
- Leaving
BlockNtlmv1SSOat 0. It reduces protection7; set an end date. - One network for staff, guests and devices. BSI forbids WLANs that couple security zones3.
What this looks like at your size
Small team, no security staff
- Ask your IT provider for EAP-TLS with Cloud PKI and cloud RADIUS instead of a staff password.
- Put guests on their own SSID and VLAN with internet only, and printers and cameras on another.
- Switch off network ports in meeting rooms and reception that nobody uses.
Growing, with IT or security staff
- Put all managed devices on EAP-TLS; allow PEAP-MSCHAPv2 only as a named exception with an end date.
- Enable 802.1X with MAC fallback on access switches, public areas first.
- Turn on rogue AP detection and send RADIUS and controller logs to the SIEM.